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Dextraze: “A” Company Attack

Account of “A” Company Attack on
Troteval Farm by the Fusiliers
Mont-Royal on 24 July 1944
Major Jacques Dextraze (as given to Captain Joseph Engler at Caen), 30 July 1944

O

n 20 July, four days before this
attack, my battalion had put
in an attack on Beauvoir (043614)
and Troteval (051613) Farms and
Verrières (052602). That attack ended
with our holding Beauvoir Farm but
we were not successful in taking
Troteval Farm or Verrières. We
suffered heavy casualties. Soon my
Commanding Officer was told that it
was essential that Troteval Farm be
captured. This was necessary because
4th Brigade was going to attack using
as a starting line the East-West road
which runs just North of Troteval
Farm. To secure the starting line the
farm had to be ours. The battalion
itself was not yet reinforced to the
point where a full company could
be spared for the attack on Troteval
Farm. Actually cooks and drivers
were being placed in the trenches
to hold what ground we had taken.
Because of this numerical lack in
the battalion, I was given the job of
selecting a hand-picked company of
75 all ranks for the attack on Troteval
Farm.
Troteval Farm itself consists of
a walled enclosure divided into an
orchard to the South and gardens to
the North with the farmhouse and
courtyard proper on the centre of the
left flank. It is surrounded by open
wheat fields. The night was clear and

Abstract: General J.A. Dextraze, “J Dex”
to Canada’s post-war army, served as
Chief of the Defence Staff from 1972 to
1975 but in 1944 he was a 24-year-old
company commander in Les Fusiliers de
Mont-Royal (FMR). This account of the
action carried out by his company on 24
July 1944 offers a graphic description
of the challenges confronting the
Canadians during the battles for
Normandy. This attack was conducted
to clear the start line for Operation
Spring which would commence the next
day. Though written in the first person,
this report was drafted by Captain Joe
Engler, the historical officer assigned to
2nd Canadian Infantry Division. It was
his job to collect important documents
and records, as well as to conduct
interviews with the fighting soldiers,
which would allow later historical
narratives to be accurately written.
Engler had the dubious distinction of
being the only historical officer to be
killed in action when he drove into an
ambush on 1 October 1944.

there was moonlight and visibility
was excellent.
The force of the enemy was
estimated to be about two platoons
with six tanks. He had a valuable
observation post (OP) at 060606.
My general plan was that, from
a starting line about 1000 yards NE
of the farm, the company should
advance with two platoons up and
one in reserve. On the 24 July at 2000
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hours we crossed the starting line,
which was merely a position in the
open wheat fields stretching from
about 043619 to 047623. Our advance
was through full-grown wheat fields
although the right platoon did meet
some fields of more open ground.
The forward platoons were to encircle
the flanks of the farm and, once
they were in position and almost
simultaneously, the reserve platoon
was to strike the farm from the
NW corner as the forward platoons
opened fire from the flanks. Then
as the centre platoon cleared the
buildings and the orchard to the
South, the reserve platoons were to be
moving their southernmost sections
around to the rear so that the rear
would be covered with fire and the
cut-off completed.
In support I had 1 squadron of
tanks, 1 field regiment, 1 medium
regiment, 4.2-inch mortars, and the
3-inch mortars of the Fusiliers MontRoyal and the South Saskatchewan
Regiment. The tanks were in the
rear covering each flank. The 3-inch
mortars were to give fire for 20
minutes on our very open left flank.
From H minus 30 to H plus 4 the
mediums were to play on the farm.
From H plus 15 to H plus 19 they fired
on Verrières and Tilly-la-Campagne.
From H plus 15 the artillery lifted
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but the field regiment remained on
call. Two anti-tank guns were also in
support and these I planned to place
behind the farm itself to cover our
flanks. Task 2 for the 3-inch mortars
was around the area of the VerrièresHubert-Folie road. The 4.2-inch
mortars gave us screening fire in the
area northeast of Tilly-la-Campagne
from H plus 20 to H plus 40. I put
eight light machine guns at point
045614. These came into action at H
plus 45. Belts of defensive fire were
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ready to be laid completely around
the objective by 6 Field Regiment.
We moved very close, only 75
yards from our barrage, taking the
chance, in this case luckily, that no
one would be hit. My appreciation
was that there were so many men in
the farm that if my force of 75 had
been 300 yards behind the barrage,
the force in the farm would have had
time to reorganize in such strength
as to prevent us from seizing and
holding the farm.

My advance was very fast, about
80 yards per minute. The centre
platoon rushed for the northwest
corner as soon as the flank fire
platoons were in place. As the platoon
went in from the northwest corner, the
flanking platoon sent their sections to
the rear to give a cut-off by cross-fire
so that the farm was surrounded with
automatic fire. At that moment there
were no bodies behind the farm so
that the clearing platoon was able
to fire freely without endangering
the other platoons. We reached our
objective about 2015 hours. Clearing
the farm took about 15 minutes.
Just as we waited nearby for the
artillery to lift we could see Jerry
running through the orchard and
farm buildings from the fields with
neither helmets nor weapons. Tanks
appeared very shortly afterwards
and opened on the flank platoons.
We replied by attacking them with
PIATs and grenades. The tanks had
been harboured just over a small crest
and appeared first about 150 yards
from the farm.
When a force is small in relation
to the objective it seeks to hold,
consolidation should be close on the
objective. In this case we of course
did not consolidate in the farm but
we did not go more than 50 yards
away from it except the rear platoon
which covered a rather larger area.
The forward platoons remained
close around the farm. It is not wise
to consolidate three or four hundred
yards past an objective, unless one
has considerable force. In this case
we occupied the slit trenches Jerry
himself had built.
At 0200 hours we received an
order to withdraw by 0300 hours
because tanks were moving in on me
on the left flank, and brigade planned
to bring artillery on them to get rid of
them. I could not report these because
my wireless was off and I felt that in
any case we were dug in and were in
little danger. Originally there were
six tanks hull-down just on the crest

2

artillery had knocked holes in the
walls and in most of the buildings,
but one building had no opening in
it and a PIAT was used to cut a way
through. The PIAT explosion brought
Jerry crawling out.
The enemy of course did not
occupy the farm but had light
machine guns in the corners of the
orchard. He was outside in the
fields when our shells came down,
apparently caught unexpectedly. He
never thought we were so close. The
garden and orchard had snipers and
they were out in the fields as well. We
found slit trenches inside the walls
and outside. Machine gun posts were

Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Dextraze examines
a map prior to an operation late in the war
when he commanded the Fusiliers Mont-Royal.
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about 150 yards south of Troteval
Farm. When they approached us we
attacked them with PIATs and No.36
grenades. Four of them moved off to
the southwest and two others moved
to the southeast. Finally we heard
them again about 0200 hours when
we were ordered to withdraw. The
medium artillery fire drove them
away although it probably did not
injure them. At 0300 hours I pulled
out with all my men except one
section of one platoon which I left
against orders in order to protect our
anti-tank guns. The men came out
gradually and orderly. At this time
there was a great deal of shelling and
air attack as well. When the artillery
shoot was finished, we re-occupied
the farm without opposition.
My men took only their weapons,
skeleton web, and a ground sheet
in which was rolled a tin of bullybeef and some hard-tack. Each man
carried two No.36 grenades and with
each Bren there were 15 magazines.
No body armour was worn.
I had 18 Brens instead of the usual
9 and thus had only Bren groups. The
No.2s carried rifles and the section
leaders carried Stens, but there
were no rifle groups as such. Each
platoon had one PIAT and six Brens,
a total of 25 men per platoon. The
actual clearing of the farm was done
with light machine guns and No.36
grenades. The Brens were carried
with a sling and when held firmly
against the hip were as flexible as was
necessary. Our section leaders picked
up rifles which they found in the
area, which belonged to the men of
my battalion who had been casualties
during the attack two days ago. The
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This air photograph of Troteval and
Beauvoir Farms was taken on 9 July
1944 before the area saw much fighting.
The start line for the FMR attack was in
the top left corner of the photograph.
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located in the two northern corners of
the wall and to the southwest in the
field.
His defences included a string
of mines about 50 yards from the
farm circling all around it, flat on
the ground with just a bit of hay to
cover the mines. We lost two carriers
because of these. We found one
sniper in the orchard tied into a tree
with ropes. He must have stayed
there through the barrage with only
his ammunition and rifle and how
he stood our fire I don’t know. No

snipers were upstairs at the windows.
In reply to our shelling Jerry shelled
the right and left flanks of the farm.
He evidently did not expect our entry
to be from the corner on diagonal.
Because we stayed so close to the
barrage, his DF fire came down where
he expected us to be at this time,
that is, a safe distance behind us. His
snipers were poor shots but his tanks
were good.
Jerry is no good at night. He
needs only noise to frighten him
away. On one occasion a burst of Bren

fire unaimed into a field caused him
to pull out from the area.
Our artillery was marvellous.
All its defensive fire tasks were
carried out when requested and
Verrières, Tilly-la-Campagne, and
the areas northwest of Verrières were
surrounded with belts of fire, in fact
there was protective fire all round.
This fire was very accurate. I left two
sections to protect my anti-tank guns
on withdrawal and my men were 150
yards from the farm itself. Fire came
down on the farm, yet no men were
hit. The rest of the company had
pulled out five minutes before the
barrage began.

Lessons
1.

2.

3.

Vehicles must have sand-bags in
them and officers must check to
see that they remain in. This will
save lives and vehicles.
Always tell your men exactly
where you, the company
commander, will be at various
phases of the battle. The platoon
commanders and section leaders
will come for no reason at all or
will invent silly errands to come
and see if you are there. Knowing
you are there reassures them. Do
not let them worry. If the wireless
link with battalion is out, do not
mention it, merely tell them all
is well. When they know where
you are and feel that you are
confident they themselves will
be confident and aggressive.
The commander must stay
back, until the show is over, at
a point where he can view all
his forces or at least know what

Troteval and Beauvoir Farms, along with
the village of Verrières, are visible in this
air photo was taken on 30 July 1944,
almost a week after the FMR operation.
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Before and after photos of Troteval farm taken on 9 and 30 July show much destruction. Apart for the
obvious shell holes in the fields, a close examination reveals breaches in the wall around the farm, de-roofed
buildings and numerous other physical scars.

4.

5.

6.

7.

they are doing. It is unwise to
go forward because the risk of
losing a commander is serious
and because he must be able
to see the whole battle if he is
to influence it. If he is with the
forward platoon he is unable to
find out what the other platoons
are doing. There are other ways
and other places for the company
commander to show that he is
not afraid.
When advancing go slowly and
thoroughly. Burn every haystack.
Clear a few houses thoroughly
and not many haphazardly.
We have a preponderance of
equipment and should use it
boldly.
Don’t consolidate too far forward
of your objective if you have a
small force.
Stretcher-bearers should be well
forward.
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8.

Weapons must be picked up from
casualties and kept with the part
of the company which is still
fighting.
9. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s s h o u l d , i f
possible, accustom themselves
to battle gradually.
10. Take chances with the artillery
barrage, being close to it is
essential. Where sticky fighting
is likely, for example in a village
clearing, the artillery lift should
be so arranged that thoroughness
in clearing does not mean losing
the barrage.
11. Men never forget. An officer’s
influence on his men in times
of action varies with the
consideration he has shown them
in training. If they respect him
during training they will respond
to his control under fire.
12. Defensive fire tasks must be laid
down all around the objective

beforehand. There is neither
time nor opportunity in action to
indicate targets.
13. Supporting arms are the key
to success. Their use must be
carefully planned.
14. When the enemy comes out
unarmed with his hands up or
with the evident intention to
surrender, don’t shoot him. This
saves a lot of trouble for if the
first few are treated properly the
whole bunch will follow. Caution
however, is necessary.
Jacques Dextraze (1919-1993) was
born in Montreal and served with the
Fusiliers Mont-Royal during the Second
World War, eventually commanding
the battalion. He was awarded the
Distinguished Service Order and bar
for his actions during the war. Later, he
commanded the 2nd Battalion, Royal
22e Régiment in Korea and served
with the Canadin Army on various
UN deployments. He rose to the rank
of general and ending his career as the
Canadian Forces’ chief of the defence staff
from 1972-77.
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